The core constructive task of the field of cryptography is that of creating cryptographic primitives (e.g. private-key encryption, public-key encryption, message authentication codes,...) with provable security guarantees. Where perfect (information theoretic) security is impossible, cryptographers must in practice necessarily rely on the assumption that some problem is hard to solve in nearly every case (a computational hardness assumption). Primitives in these cases generally provide guarantees of the following informal form: assuming that an enemy takes a long time to solve some problem Y , a system using X is secure.
Overview
The core constructive task of the field of cryptography is that of creating cryptographic primitives (e.g. private-key encryption, public-key encryption, message authentication codes,...) with provable security guarantees. Where perfect (information theoretic) security is impossible, cryptographers must in practice necessarily rely on the assumption that some problem is hard to solve in nearly every case (a computational hardness assumption). Primitives in these cases generally provide guarantees of the following informal form: assuming that an enemy takes a long time to solve some problem Y , a system using X is secure.
In general, the computational hardness assumptions used in the wild are derived from problems for which many have tried and failed to provide polynomial-time solutions; some of the most common examples include integer factorization, quadratic residuosity, the discrete log problem, and on. At best, our reliance on these problems nests security in the hope that these specific, at times disparate problems will continue to elude researchers: by and large, none of these assumptions are supported by a well-founded general description of hardness as we would see in e.g. complexity theory. As such, one of the so-called 'holy grails' of cryptography is to instead vest the hopes for security in a single well-founded, well-known, and well-studied assumption, such as the assumption that P ≠ N P .
While the reliable use of some NP-complete problem in tandem with the assumption that P ≠ N P has eluded cryptographers due to lack of results showing average-case hardness, one alternative which has been explored is reliance on assumptions that solving certain NP-hard optimization problems within some degree of accuracy is computationally difficult in specific instance classes. In this work, we explore one such example of this effort, [10] , which attempts to construct cryptographic primitives by relying on the planted clique conjecture. More specifically, we (1) present [10] in summary, (2) propose a simple cryptanalytic method for the one-way function primitive suggested in [10] using approximation algorithms, and (3) consider the feasibility of such cryptanalysis in the context of existing approximation algorithms for the maximum clique problem. 2 Hiding Cliques for Cryptographic Security: Attempted Cryptography from the Planted Clique Conjecture
In "Hiding Cliques for Cryptographic Security" [10] , Juels and Peinado attempt to demonstrate a manner in which the problem of finding large cliques in random graphs may be used to construct cryptographic primitives. Specifically, the authors note that it is conjectured that no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm exists which is able to find cliques of size ≥ (1 + ǫ) log 2 n for any ǫ > 0 in random graphs with constant edge probability 1 2 and attempt to develop cryptographic primitives on the assumption that this conjecture is true.
The authors begin with a general description of 'hard' graph problems from the perspective of a standard variation of the clique problem in undirected graphs: given an undirected graph G = (V, E) and an integer k < V , return a complete subgraph of G a number of nodes as close as possible to k. Following a discussion of the need for average-case hardness in cryptography, the authors then introduce the context of their own contribution: where they acknowledge the previously stated conjecture regarding the ability to find 'large' cliques in random graphs, the authors show that the problem of finding 'large' cliques in random graphs with a constant number of artificially placed cliques (of size 1 + ǫ, ∀ǫ, 1 ≥ ǫ > 0) is just as hard as the truly random case 1 . This contribution thereby admits a probabilistic method whereby hard instances of the clique problem may be generated and then used as the basis of cryptographic primitives.
The authors do note that the actual security yielded by a naive application of this conjecture is weak. In particular, the authors note that the largest natural clique size in a random graph with edge probability 1 2 is 2 log 2 n. As such, the brute-force approach needs only to iterate through all
2 log 2 n-node subsets of V and therefore takes time pseudopolynomial in n; attacks relying on this bruteforce approach may therefore be entirely practical. The authors claim that this is a non-issue by virtue of the fact the complexity of the brute-force approach may be increased by increasing edge probability p from 1 2 (and thus the size of the largest clique); they justify this statement by further claiming that their main result holds for general edge probabilities.
Following a discussion of related work largely restricted to the history of what we now know as the planted clique conjecture, the authors present a proof of their main result which we summarize. In the following proof sketch, the authors denote by p the distribution G n,1 2 from the Erdos-Renyi random graph model (graphs consisting of n nodes where each edge is present with probability 1 2 ); they denote by p ′ k the distribution of graphs obtained by sampling from p and uniformly selecting a subgraph of k nodes to make complete.
Main theorem (T1) For k ≤ (2 − δ) log 2 n and 2 ≥ δ > 0, if there exists an algorithm A which finds Analysis of Algorithms II Project Report, Spring 2017 Aubrey Alston (ada2145@columbia.edu), Yanrong Wo (yw2513@columbia.edu) cliques of size (1 + ǫ) log 2 n with probability
(where q(n) is a polynomial) in graphs drawn from p ′ k , A also finds cliques of size (1 + ǫ) log 2 n with probability
in graphs drawn from p for some polynomial q ′ (n).
Proof of T1 In their proof, given graph G, the authors denote by C k (G) the number of cliques of size k in G. For G drawn from some distribution D, C k (G) is a random variable, and the authors refer to its expectation by E k . Because this result is not strictly crucial with respect to our analysis (our analysis will ultimately be indifferent to it), we simply provide a high-level sketch of the proof. The first logical step in the proof is to show that, when
, the probability of seeing G when drawing inputs from p ′ k is negligibly far from that of seeing G when drawing from p. The next logical step is to prove that the variance of C k (G ∼ p ′ k ) is satisfactorily small, thereby yielding that only a negligible fraction of graphs from the support of p
This allows them to conclude that there exists only a negligible fraction ∆ of the support for which p(G) and p ′ k (G) differ non-negligibly. Thus for the non-negligible 1 − ∆-fraction of inputs which are close, we would expect a non-negligible difference in correctness when running A on inputs drawn from this subset of the support according to p (and thus a non-negligible difference in correctness overall).◻.
The authors further claim (but do not prove) that T1 holds for general edge probabilities p > . Stated equivalently, they claim that the following also holds: For k ≤ (2 − δ) log 1 p n and 2 ≥ δ > 0, if there exists an algorithm A which finds cliques of size (1 + ǫ) log 1 p n with probability
(where q(n) is a polynomial) in graphs drawn from p ′ k , A also finds cliques of size (1 + ǫ) log 1 p n with probability
After proving their primary result, the authors conclude the article by presenting a means of constructing cryptographic primitives using the assumption that there does not exist a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm able to find cliques of size (1 + ǫ) log 1 p n in graphs drawn from G n,p . Of the primitives described, we focus our attention on their design of a secure one-way function 2 . We reproduce the OWF described below:
Algorithm 1 OWF from the Planted Clique Problem
Connect all vertices in K, obtaining modified graph G ′ .
3:
return G ′ 4: end procedure (In the formal sense of a cryptographic one-way function, the first argument to f would technically need to be an advice string s sampling G ∼ G n,p when s is sampled uniformly. (So it may be the case that s ≥ n.).)
A Cryptanalytic Method using Approximation
In this section, we (a) qualify how and under what specific assumptions the function f proposed by Juels and Peinado is a cryptographic one-way function and (b) suggest a simple means of cryptanalysis of f using nothing more than approximation algorithms.
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Formally, a cryptographic one-way function is a function g which is (1) computable in polynomial time but (2) for which no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A (modeled as a randomized algorithm with source of randomness r) is able to compute a pseudo-inverse of g except with negligible probability. In other words,
In the specific case of the candidate one-way function f n,p,k suggested by Juels and Peinado, we see that condition (1) is satisfied in that the operation of connecting k vertices in an n-node graph may be trivially performed in polynomial time. With respect to condition (2) , consider the following modification to the computational variant of the planted clique conjecture as given in [2]:
1. Draw an Erdos-Renyi random graph G from the distribution G n,p for p ≥ 
3. Return G.
The problem in this setting is, as usual, to find a clique in G of size k or output ∅ if none exists.
We claim now that f n,p,k satisfies condition (2) of a one-way function under the assumption that the computational planted clique problem is hard 3 in G n,p and for k in the range
To show this, say that there exists a p.p.tm adversary A which succeeds against f n,p,k with non-negligible probability. In the planted clique setting, say that we flip heads in the second step. Since the graph G returned in the third step and the output of f n,p,k are both graphs drawn from G n,p with a clique of size k ∈ [log 1 p n, 2 log 1 p n] embedded, A will with high probability be able to recover a clique of size k from the former because it is able to do so from the latter.
For A which only ever returns cliques of size k or the empty set, we thus see that A succeeds in the planted clique setting with probability greater than or equal to half the probability it does so against f n,p,k as a one-way function, therefore non-negligibly by our choice of A. By the contrapositive of this conclusion, we have that f n,p,k is a secure one-way function under the assumption that the computational planted clique problem is hard in G n,p and for k in the range k ∈ [log 1 p n, 2 log 1 p n].
Cryptanalysis through Approximation
We have so far established that the one-way function of Juels and Peinado is secure under the assumption that that the computational planted clique problem is hard in G n,p and for k in the range k ∈ [log 1 p n, 2 log 1 p n]. It follows directly, however, that the inverse of this statement is also true: namely, if the computational planted clique problem can be solved in G n,p and for k in the range k ∈ [log 1 p n, 2 log 1 p n] with high probability, then f n,p,k is not secure. We use this fact as a basis for cryptanalysis of f n,p,k .
Say that we have an algorithm B which is able to solve the computational planted clique problem in
The output of f n,p,k (⋅) is a graph drawn from G n,p with a clique of size k embedded: since this corresponds to the heads case of the planted clique setting, B(G) should will be able to output a clique C of size k with high probability. This clique C satisfies f n,p,k (G, B(G) = C) = f n,p,k (⋅), and so the existence of B allows us to cryptanalytically invert f n,p,k in a direct manner.
Extending the above analysis, we thus propose to cryptanalyze any practical implementation or use of f n,p,k as follows:
1. Compile a finite, fixed set of algorithms [A] approximating the maximum clique problem in graphs drawn from G n,p .
2.
On obtaining an evaluation of f n,p,k (⋅) = G ′ , attempt to invert it by running A(G) for all A ∈ [A], returning the largest clique returned over all algorithms.
This method simply hedges cryptanalysis on the capabilities of approximation algorithms for the maximum clique problem in random graphs: if there exists an approximation algorithm which finds large cliques with high probability for some parameterization of f n,p,k , we may succeed in inverting the function (or breaking any primitive which might be based on f n,p,k ) as we previously illustrated. One might appreciate, however, that cryptanalysis frees us from being tied to relying only on algorithms which require only polynomial time; a valid cryptanalytic attack may be conducted, for example, by a practical pseudo-polynomial algorithm which runs in parallel. As such, [A] may include anything from standard polynomial-time approximation algorithms to a clever variant of a brute-force approach.
In the rest of this report, we explore existing approximation algorithms to determine the extent to which such cryptanalysis is possible given our current capabilities. We then use the information we uncover during this exploration to discuss the implications on methods of constructing cryptographic primitives with planted cliques in the manner of [10] .
Existing Approximation Algorithms
We now shift our focus to survey existing strategies for searching for cliques in graphs. We split this survey into two parts: (1) an exploration of methods constructed specifically for random graphs and (2) an exploration of the state-of-the-art with respect to approximation of the maximum clique problem.
Methods for Planted Cliques in Random Graphs

The Greedy Approach
One of the first formulations of the planted clique problem was given by Karp in [13] . In his exposition, Karp gave a probabilistic analysis of a natural greedy approach to searching for cliques in random graphs. This method in particular is interesting because of its simplicity and because more sophisticated methods achieve only comparable performance [9] . We reproduce the basic form of this algorithm below:
Algorithm 2 Greedy Clique Search
Choose a random vertex v ∈ V .
3:
Set T to be the subgraph induced by v and its neighborhood in G.
4:
Set C = {v} 5: while T contains nodes not in C do
6:
Choose a random vertex u ∈ T .
7:
Add u to C.
8:
Set T ′ to be the subgraph induced by u and its neighborhood in T .
9:
Set T = T ′ .
10:
end while
11:
return C 12: end procedure Space and Time It may be seen trivially that this algorithm requires polynomial time and space (polynomial with respect to n). There is one iteration per node in the set C returned, of size at most n, and the operation to update T may be performed naively in time O(n) assuming O(1) edge membership lookup, so the entire algorithm completes in time O(n 2 ) (this is by no means tight). Similarly, the algorithm needs only to store a constant number of copies of subgraphs of G, and so space space requireed is linear in the size of the original input.
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Aubrey Alston (ada2145@columbia.edu), Yanrong Wo (yw2513@columbia.edu) Approximation Performance Karp gives a fairly direct probabilistic analysis which reveals that the given greedy algorithm will find a clique of size (1 + o(1)) log 1 p n in expectation. Note first in the greedy algorithm that, at any iteration C is a subset of V and that T is the subgraph of G induced by C and all nodes in G which are adjacent to all nodes in C. Note also that for each iteration in which the algorithm does not terminate C grows by 1. Since the algorithm only ever chooses nodes adjacent to all of C, C is a clique of size i during iteration i.
Draw a graph G = (V, E) from G n,p . Now fix an arbitrary subset S i ⊆ V of V , S i = i ≤ n; for our purposes, say S i is C at the ith iteration of the greedy algorithm. For all u ∈ V ∖ S i , define an indicator random variable N u which is 1 if and only if u is adjacent to all nodes in S i . Because edge probabilities are disjoint, we know
by linearity of expectation, we therefore may obtain
As a result, the earliest iteration i such that the only nodes in T are the nodes in C (there are no more nodes adjacent to all of C) in expectation satisfies
n. During this iteration, C is a clique of size i, and so, in expectation, the algorithm will return a clique of this size.
A further note which is perhaps more useful to our analysis than a general exploration of the planted clique problem is this: the variance in the number of nodes adjacent to all of C in iteration i obeys
because the indicators N u are not correlated and because they obey a Bernoulli distribution. Thus, since i brings (n − i)p i close to 0, it will likewise bring (n − i)p
close to 0, meaning that there is little variance in the size of the clique returned by this greedy algorithm.
The Metropolis Process
In [9] , Jerrum explores a method of applying a simplified form of simulated annealing called the Metropolis process to the planted clique problem. He ultimately finds that, though the method is more sophisticated, it requires super-polynomial time in order to find cliques larger than those found by greedy methods like the one discussed in the previous section.
Jerrum begins by describing what he calls the Metropolis process on cliques in a graph G = (V, E):
1. At the current instant, let a clique K be the 'state' of our system.
Metropolis step:
(a) Choose a node v uniformly at random from V .
(c) If v ∈ K, remove v from K with probability λ −1 , where λ is the parameter of the Metropolis process.
The key difference between the Metropolis algorithm and a standard greedy algorithm is the λ ≥ 1 temperature parameter: informally, it 'tunes' the willingness of the algorithm to backtrack from local optima. Jerrum also foreshadows properties of the method to be shown, noting the following properties of the process which make it seem like a plausible soluton to the planted clique problem:
• The Metropolis process leads to an equillibrium distribution in which the probability of the current state being any particular clique K is proportional to λ K : in this way, the algorithm prefers larger cliques to smaller ones.
• While increasing the λ parameter to emphasize this difference does not come without a time tradeoff, λ doesn't need to be excessively large.
The hope for the Metropolis process rests wholly in the desire for quick convergence; the author notes that this work dashes this hope, showing that the process takes times superpolynomial in n to reach a state corresponding to a clique of size (1 + ǫ) log 2 n regardless of the choice of temperature λ.
We now summarize the core analysis given by Jerrum. Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph on n nodes, and choose a temperature parameter λ ≥ 1. The Metropolis process on G is discussed as a Markov chain (G, λ) in which the state space Ω is the set of all cliques within G and where there are transitions between states if and only if K∆K ′ ≤ 1 4 . The transition probabilities K ⇒ K ′ in this chain are given by the following expression:
Following this description of the process, Jerrum then delegates to elementary results in stochastic models to demonstrate that (G, λ) has a unique stationary distribution π(K) = λ
Main result: A Lower Bound Argument The main result of this work is stated formally as follows: for G ∼ G n,p and every λ ≥ 1, there exists an initial state from which the expected time for the Metropolis process to reach a clique of size at least (1 + ǫ) log 2 n exceeds n Ω(log 2 n) . In order to prove this theorem, the author first introduces the notion of a m-gateway, which is simply a clique from which there exists a path with non-zero transition probabilities to a clique of size m in the Metropolis process. The author then states and proves a lemma which establishes that for k = (1 + 2 3 ǫ) log 2 n, the proportion of k-cliques which are m = (1 + ǫ) log 2 n-gateways is less than n −Ω(log 2 n) . Logically, the purpose of this lemma within the proof is to show that (1+ǫ)-cliques are generally inaccessible because m-gateway k-cliques are sparse (and, for the chosen m, the algorithm must pass through some k-clique).
The proof of the main theorem then applies this lemma in a straightforward manner. Given (G, λ), and fixing k and m as in the lemma, we take C as the set of k-cliques which are also m gateways. Using C, we then obtain a partition (S,S) such that S is the set of states that may be reached from the empty clique (initial state of the process) without passing through C. The proof then uses lemma 1 and the fact that any m-clique must pass through a k-clique to show that the small size of C constricts paths from S toS according to the superpolynomial bound of n −Ω(log 2 n) . The authors then demonstrate formally that the expected time (number of iterations). until the first entrance intoS is itself therefore bounded from below by n −Ω(log 2 n) , thus that there must necessarily exist an initial state which takes as long (and thus at least as long to reach an m = (1 + ǫ) log 2 n-clique located inS).
Extensions: Larger Cliques and Varying Edge Densities Jerrum also extends his main result to encompass cases corresponding to (a) the presence of large cliques and (b) the case where the edge probability is varied. The primary argument follows the same pattern as the proof of the main theorem, and he is able to conclude in both cases that the superpolynomial bound holds. More specifically, he shows the following:
• For any G ∼ G n,p containing a clique of size n β , 0 < β < and every λ ≥ 1, there exists an initial state from which the expected time for the Metropolis process takes time n Ω(log 2 n) to find a clique of size (1 + ǫ) log 2 n.
• For any G ∼ G n,p , there exists an initial state from which the expected time for the Metropolis process takes time n Ω(log 1 p n) to find a clique of size (1 + ǫ) log 1 p n. 4 Here, ∆ means symmetric set difference.
Analysis of
As we have seen thus far, there seems to be a 'hard roof' with respect to the size of cliques found in strictly polynomial time by these methods hovering around (1 + o(1)) log 1 p n. While the variance admitted by the greedy approach does not offer much leeway, a key observation by Jerrum is that the theorems presented say something only about the absolute worst case of the Metropolis algorithm. This point will become especially relevant in section 5.
Finding Cliques using Spectral Methods
In
√ n); the key observation driving the algorithm is that, with high probability, a large portion of the hidden clique will be represented in the second eigenvector, v 2 . We reproduce the method below:
1. Compute the the second eigenvector, v 2 , of A using any standard polynomial-time method.
2. Sort V in decreasing order of absolute value in v 2 . Take W as the first k nodes in this order. Let Q ⊂ V be the set of nodes in V adjacent to at least 3k 4 nodes in V .
3. Return Q.
That this algorithm returns in polynomial time is immediate. There are many polynomial-time algorithms satisfactory for the first step, and the last two may be implemented as a simple sort/iterate procedure. In order to prove that the above algorithm returns a clique of size k, the authors prove some spectral properties of G; we provide an outline of the proof method and summarize the proofs given where appropriate. The authors first prove the following: Proposition 2.1 Let G ∼ G n,p be a random graph; embed a clique of size k = o(n). Then almost surely the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A satisfy that (i) λ 1 ≥ (
To prove (i), the authors use the common method of viewing λ 1 with respect to the Rayleigh quotient:
. Taking x to be the vector of all 1s, we see thus that λ 1 is at least the average degree of nodes in G. Since the degrees of G may be described by a Binomial distribution determined by edge probability, we know that the average degree in G is at least (1 2 + o(1))n almost surely.
To prove (ii), the authors rely on the proven result that max i≥2
with high probability. In order to bound the eigenvalues of G, the authors decompose A as the union of two random graphs: G 2 ∼ G k,1 2 and G 1 = G − G 2 . Trivially, G 1 now obeys G n,1 2 . This then allows the authors to decompose the adjacency matrix A as a union of two adjacency matrices; taking u 1 as the largest eigenvector of one and u 2 as the alrgest of the other, the largest Rayleigh quotient (over the subspace of vectors orthogonal to both u 1 and u 2 ) will with high probability be ≤ (1 + o(1)) √ n by the afforementioned existing result.
The rest of the proof rests on the crucial point to be made by the analysis that the eigenvector v 2 of A has the majority of its weight on the large clique in G. To show this point, the authors define a vector z ∈ R n such that z i = n − k if i ≤ k and −k otherwise. Towards showing that the weight of v 2 rests in the clique of size k, the next step in the proof is to show the following proposition to be true:
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The proof of this proposition makes use of the following lemma: with high probability,
While we will not reproduce the proof of this lemma in great detail, it follows fairly directly. In order to prove it, one must simply decompose the coordinates of (A − (k 2)I)z as random variables; the claim of the lemma then follows by applying standard Binomial estimates. The truth of the proposition follows from this lemma using standard spectral decomposition. Decompose z as a linear combination of the vectors of the orthonormal eigenbasis of A:
Using this result, the authors then show that δ 2 is less than 1 60
Within the larger scope of the analysis of this algorithm, proposition 2.3 uses proposition 2.1 to obtain that there exists a vector z − δ = c 2 v 2 collinear with v 2 which is 'heavy' in k dimensions. The authors conclude the proof of correctnesss by establishing the following two claims:
1. At least 5 6 of the k largest coordinates of v 2 correspond to vertices of the clique. The authors argue that, because δ 2 ≤ (1 60) z 2 , there are at most k 6 coordinates of δ which are greater than n 3 in absolute value. By the structure of z, then, the authors are able to conclude that at least k − d 1 of the first k coordinates have value greater than n 2 and at least n − k − d 2 of the last (n − k) coordinates have value at most n 2, where d 1 + d 2 ≤ k 6. The authors claim that this then implies the first statement of this item. 2. Every vertex outside of the clique is almost surely adjacent to less than 3k 4 vertices of W . The authors establish this through a probabilistic argument: owing to edge probability 1 2 , vertices outside of the clique are adjacent to at most (1 + o(1))k 2 vertices of the clique. Since W also contains at most 1 6 nodes not in the clique, we may bound the maximum number of neighbors in W of any non-clique node by (1 + o(1))k 2 + k 6 < Analysis of Algorithms II Project Report, Spring 2017 Aubrey Alston (ada2145@columbia.edu), Yanrong Wo (yw2513@columbia.edu) Together, these two claims conclude the proof of correctness of the algorithm. This guarantees (with high probability) by (2) that the algorithm chooses only vertices of the clique and by (1) that the algorithm takes all vertices of the clique.
The final section of [1] gives a method of extending the original algorithm in order to find cliques of size c √ n for fixed c. The main observations leading to this improvement are the following:
• By taking the subgraph induced by the neighborhood of a subset of vertices S of size s, G[S], we reduce the size of the graph to almost certainly contain only (1 + o(1))n 2 s nodes.
• When the subgraph is induced by a subset of nodes S is also a subset of the largest clique in the graph, the ratio of the clique size to the number of the nodes in the graph increases.
Noting these, the authors conclude by presenting the following polynomial-time method which extends their original algorithm:
1. Calculate s = 2 log 2 10 c + 2.
2. For all subsets S ⊂ V of size s (a) Calculate G ′ as the subgraph induced by S and nodes in the intersection of neighborhoods of all nodes in S.
3. Return ∅.
A Probabilistic Combinatorial Method
Since the publication of [1] , other authors have found alternative approaches which allow for the recovery of cliques of size c √ n in random graphs. One example is [7] , in which Feige describes another method achieving the same bound as [1] using semi-definite programming.
Another example which we will explore in greater detail in this section is a method given by Dekel et. al. in [5] . This method is of particular interest to us because (a) it achieves performance identical to that achieved in [1] , (b) it relies on a simple randomized combinatorial strategy, and (c) it is easily extended to apply to random graphs with edge probability other than 1 2 . At a high level, for a graph G ∼ G n,p with a hidden clique of size k, the algorithm proposed by Dekel et. al. is parameterized by 0 < α < 1 and β > 0 and proceeds in three stages:
1. Iteratively find subgraphs of the input graph G:
G i+1 is defined as follows: pick a random subset of vertices S i from G i which contains each vertex with probability α. DefineV i to be the set of vertices in G i that are not in S i but have at least
neighbors in S i . Intuitively, this process grows the relative size of the hidden clique with each iteration; in general, this process needs to be repeated a logarithmic number t times.
2. Search forK, the subset of the hidden clique contained in G t . This is done by computing an estimate of the size ofK, k t , and takingK as the set of vertices in G t with degree at least 
3. Find the rest of the nodes of K usingK. This is done by taking K ′ as the set containingK and all of its common neighbors. K * is taken as the set of the k largest-degree vertices in the subgraph of G induced by K ′ . K * is the set returned by the algorithm as the hidden clique.
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The main result that the authors prove about this algorithm is the following:
Theorem For c > c 0 , there exist parameters α and β such that, for G ∼ G n,1 2 with a hidden clique of size c √ n, the probability that K * (G, α, β) is the hidden clique is at least 1 − e −Θ(n ǫ 0 ) where ǫ 0 is a function of c. We provide a sketch of the proof given by the authors in [5] .
With respect to phase (1), the authors consider an iteration i of the subgraph-finding procedure to be successful if the number of nodes in G i and the number of nodes of the hidden clique in G i are each respectively close to their expected value; the authors show that this is the case with high probability. Specifically, the authors show that, in every iteration, the graph G i has the same distribution as random graphs Gn i ,1 2 with cliques of sizek i embedded (and wheren i andk i are the respective expected values). This allows the authors to conclude that the per-iteration failure probability is small enough to take a union bound over all t iterations and obtain a high success probability.
With respect to phase (2), the authors show that the setK is with high probability a subset of the hidden clique. They do this by proving two key lemmas. The first of these lemmas states that, for random graphs with embedded cliques of a certain size, there exist natural numbers D 1 and D 2 such that all non-clique nodes have degree less than or equal to D 1 and all clique nodes have degree greater than or equal D 2 . The second of these lemmas uses the previous to state that, if phase (1) completed without failure (which occurs with high probability due to their proof of the properties of phase (1)), the nodes of the hidden clique are distinguishable via D 1 and D 2 and thusK is with high probability a subset of the original hidden clique.
With respect to phase (3), the authors give a more general result that the entire hidden clique may be revealed given partial information in the form of a subset of the hidden clique. In particular, the authors show that the entire hidden clique may revealed if the size of the hidden clique k and the size of the partial clique revealed s has the following properties:
• k ∈ O(log n log log n) and s ≥ (1 + ǫ) log n • or k ∈ ω(log n log log n) and s ≥ log n + 1.
by the proof of the properties of phase (2), one of the above is the case with high probability, and so K * obtained fromK is the hidden clique.
Following their proof of the basic algorithm, the authors give multiple extensions of their algorithm, two of which are useful for our purposes.
Reducing c 0 The authors note that the basic form of their algorithm works for c ≥ c 0 for c 0 ≥ 1.65 6 . In their conclusion, the authors note that the same technique used by Alon et. al. in [1] . We summarize the differences in this more general form of the algorithm below:
1. Run phase 1 as before, except now takeV i as the set of vertices with at least p S i + β p(1 − p) S i neighbors in S i .
Define
). After phase 1 has run for t iterations, letK contain all of the vertices in G t with degree at least p V (G t ) + (1 + p)ρ t k.
3. Phase 3 is as before, but instead let K ′ containK and all vertices in G having 1 2 (1 + p) K neighbors inK. Let K * now be the set of vertices in G having at least
Note that aboveΦ() refers to the complementary Gaussian cumulative distribution function. The proof of this generalized algorithm is the same as before, except the variable p is kept as a parameter rather than manipulated as a constant Another way to solve the planted clique problem is by relaxing the clique problem to sum-of-squares (SOS) optimization. A Sum-of-squares optimization program has the following form:
Above, "SOS forms" refers to the set of polynomials of the form:
where g i are polynomials whose non-zero terms are all of the same degree. SOS programs are generally non-convex, and the standard method of solving them relies on convex relaxations (e.g. through relaxing constraints to semi-definite constraints on matrices). More specifically, there exists a hierarchy of convex relaxations called the SOS hierarchy which is indexed by a natural number parameter d: as d increases, solving power increases at the expense of increased computational cost. A recent paper by Barak et. al. looks at the limitations of SOS optimization when used to address the planted clique problem [3] . The only method of solving the SOS relaxation of the planted clique problem at the dth level of the hierarchy cited in this work (and the related lower bounds papers which they cite) requires time n O(d) and involves expressing the program as a SDP in n O(d) variables. The authors claimed to have derived a somewhat tight lower bound on the size of cliques able to be found in graphs drawn from G n,1 2 for a given degree d. The bound was shown to be n −o(1) . To achieve this bound, the authors apply a computational variant of standard Bayesian probability. Barak et al. explain that another way to view SOS optimization is as a way to get a set of internally consistent computational probabilities. The probabilities of interest in the planted clique problem refer to probabilities of nodes being in the clique given that another node is or is not in a clique or the fact that nodes with larger degrees are more likely to be in the clique. These probabilities can be seen as giving rise to a pseudo-distribution which can then be used to prove properties about the solution space of an SOS program relaxed to the dth level of the hierarchy. Because [3] provides only a lower bound on a specific approach, we do not explore the proof of the authors in detail; however, we note that the authors achieve their bound by illustrating that the ability to distinguish large cliques using these pseudo-distributions degenerates as the clique number k is less than n 1 2−δ .
Methods for General Graphs
The previous sub-section concerned itself with exploring methods catering specifically to random graphs drawn according to the Erdos-Renyi model. Another obvious family of algorithms relevant to the OWF f n,k,p is the family of algorithms concerned with finding approximately the largest clique in a general Analysis of Algorithms II Project Report, Spring 2017 Aubrey Alston (ada2145@columbia.edu), Yanrong Wo (yw2513@columbia.edu) graph G. Because the maximum clique problem is known to be hard to approximate with a factor of O(n 1−δ ) unless P = N P [14] , we restrict our exploration of this class of algorithms to the single bestknown approximation algorithm for the maximum clique problem [11] .
Feige's Algorithm: The State of the Art
The final algorithm is an approximation of maximum clique by Feige that achieves an approximation factor of O(n(log log n) 2 log 3 n) in general graphs [6] . To get this ratio, Feige first proposes a new algorithm that can generally find cliques of at least size t log 3k ( n t ) − 3 given that the graph has a clique of size n k . When t = ω( log n log log n ) the proposed algorithm can find cliques of size ( log n log logn ) 2 in polynomial time given the graph has a clique with size at least n (log n) b for some arbitrary b. The author then uses this algorithm in conjunction with Boppana and Halldorsson's existing algorithm [4] to achieve the approximation ratio.
We now describe the Feige's presentation of his algorithm. Let G(V, E) be a graph with n vertices with a clique of size The general intuition behind the proof of the lemma above comes from the observations that (1) the union of poor subgraphs results is a poor subgraph and that (2) removing a poor subgraph from G will increase the density of the maximum clique in G'. The claim of the lemma then follows directly.
[6] then begins to explain the algorithm at a very high level. Intuitively, the algorithm proceeds in a sequence of phases, at the end of which one of the following is true: Using lemma 1, we know that, at the start of each phase (after the subgraph is removed), the size of the clique in G ′ will be at least
. Lemma 1 also tells us that V ′ will be ≥ n 2k
, so this algorithm must terminate and give us a final clique of at least size t log 3k ( n 12k 2 t ) > t log 3k ( n t − 3). Each phase has several iterations that each take as input a subgraph of G ′ , G"(V ", E"), (or initially just G ′ ) and a set of vertices C ∈ V ′ V " that create a clique (or initially an empty set). Each iteration works as follows:
1. If V " < 6kt, return C as clique 2. Partition V " into disjoint parts of size 2kt vertices.
3. For each part P i (a) For each subset of vertices S ij of P i with cardinality t i. Let N (S ij ) be the set of vertices ∈ V " S i,j that are connected in G" to every vertex in S ij
ii. If the subgraph of G" induced on S ij is a clique and
, then let C = C ∪ S ij and let G" be the subgraph induced on N (S ij ). Return and start the next iteration.
(b) Else return V" as as a poor subgraph.
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Aubrey Alston (ada2145@columbia.edu), Yanrong Wo (yw2513@columbia.edu) Feige then analyzes the run-time. Each iteration will remove at least t vertices from V ′ , so there are V ′ t maximum iterations. In each iteration, there are 2kt t subsets to go through, so the whole phase will be polynomial if 2kt t is polynomial in n. So, given the choice of t mentioned earlier, it will be polynomial in run-time.
Feige then uses proof by contradiction to shows that if a phase says V " is poor, that it is actually poor (i.e. does not contain a clique of size
). He assumes there is a clique of size
and applies the pigeon-hole principle to say that one of the parts P i must contain at least t vertices from this clique and thus V " would not be returned as a poor subgraph.
The author then proves that the phase outputs C, then C must be a clique in G ′ and have at least size t ⋅ log 3k (
). C must be a clique in G ′ because everything unioned with C was a clique and based off our modification of G ′ , all later nodes that are being considered to be added to C will have been neighbors to everything in C. The size comes from the fact that each iteration adds t vertices to C and the number of iterations to get V ′ to 6kt is at least log 3k (
).
Feige then moves on to the final, complete presentation of his approximation algorithm which makes use of three cases. If the size of the maximum clique is < n (log n) 3 , output a single vertex to obtain an approximation ratio of O( n (log n) 3 ). If the size of the maximum clique is larger than n (log n) 3 , use the previous algorithm to obtain an O( n(log log n) 2 (log n) 3 ) approximation ratio in polynomial time (the size of maximum clique is O( n logn )). If the size of the maximum clique is larger than n logn , we need to modify the previous algorithm by using Boppana and Halldorsson's algorithm [4] in order to find cliques larger than ( log n loglogn
Their algorithm relies on the fact that any graph with n = s+r−2 s−1
will either have an independent set of size r or a clique of size s and then gives the algorithm to find either the independent set or the clique [4] . For the modified algorithm, if the Boppana and Halldorsson's algorithm returns a clique, then use that as the output, otherwise if it returns an independent set, then use the independent set to discover a poor subgraph and remove it. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Given a graph with a clique larger than 2n log log nlogn, the above algorithm will find a clique of at least size (log n) 3 6 log log n From the proposition, we get that using the above will given an O(n( log log n log n ) 3 ) approximation ratio.
Note that this approximation ratio, O(n(
, is a factor ω(log log n), off from the O(n (log log n) 2 (log n) 3 ) goal. So to save another ω(log log n), Feige adapts another technique from Halldorsson [8] . Instead of checking that N (S ij ) ≥ V " 2k−t in the detailed algorithm, we instead check N (S ij ) > n test − t where n test is the largest value satisfying n test < ( log ntest 2 log log ntest )(
V " 2k
). In the case that
the Boppana and Halldorsson algorithm on the subgraph of S ij ∪ N (S ij ). If it returns a clique of at least size logntest 6 log log ntest , then add it to C and return. Feige then states that the analysis of this modified algorithm is similar to that of the originally proposed algorithm. We don't explore this in greater detail because this does not bring the approximation ratio down to an interesting point with regard to the planted clique problem (this will become clear when we attempt to apply it in cryptanalysis).
Applying the Cryptanalytic Method
In this section, we take [A] to be the set of algorithms we have explored thus far and determine the circumstances under which each would allow us to compute the pseudo-inverse of the one-way function f n,p,k suggested in [10] with non-negligible probability (thus 'breaking' the primitive). We then use this analysis to tabulate our conclusions in summary and give recommendations for secure function parameters given a desired level of security λ and our current capabilities with respect to the planted clique problem; our analysis also allows us to suggest future work as regards developing the primitive further to address practical concerns and potential vulnerabilities.
Limits of Analysis given Existing Approximation Algorithms
For each algorithm explored, we distill the circumstances under which the algorithm is able to compute the pseudo-inverse of f n,p,k . For convenience, we remind the reader that n is the number of nodes in the graph returned, p is the edge probability within the graph generated, and k = [log 1 p n, 2 log 1 p n] is the size of the clique planted in the graph returned.
Our consideration of the security of f n,p,k will be done with respect to a parameter λ. λ is the desired security parameter of the system, and it is defined as follows: any non-parallelized attack against f n,p,k must require at least 2 λ steps. In its essence, λ is a measure of how hard f n,p,k is to invert for any adversary.
The Brute-Force Approach The original paper suggesting the one-way function f n,p,k admitted that the brute-force search algorithm, though not polynomial in runtime, is still practical. The basic approach of an attack leveraging a brute-force search would involve simply enumerating all subsets of nodes of size 2 log 1 p n and checking whether the subset is completely connected. In order to satisfy the security parameter λ, we need this process to take at least 2 λ steps. Thus, one solution is as the authors describe: increase p until k has size n d for some constant d such that n n d > 2 λ ; in particular, if we consider only brute-force attacks, we suggest increasing p to be 2 log 2 λ λ and setting λ = n so that the embedded clique size is around λ 2. Another solution is to keep p = 1 2 and increase n until n log 2 n ≥ 2 log 2 n−log log n ≥ 2 λ . In this case, it would be sufficient to set n = 2
Ω( √ λ)
. This, however, is less desirable than the first solution, as it requires the generated graph to be exponential in the square root of the security parameter.
The Greedy Approach in Random Graphs In section 4.1.1, we saw an analysis of a simple randomized greedy approach to searching for large cliques in random graphs drawn from G n,p . This analysis showed that the algorithm is able to in time O(n 2 ) (where n is the number of nodes) find cliques of size (1 + o(1)) log 1 p n in expectation and that the variance of the returned clique size is very small. We thus see that, for general n and p, f n,p,k is vulnerable to the greedy approach only when k = (1 + ǫ) log 1 p n for ǫ very close to 0.
The Metropolis Process in Random Graphs In section 4.1.2, we saw a randomized method based on simulated annealing for searching for large cliques in random graphs drawn from G n,p . Where φ is the temperature parameter, the result we saw was that, for any temperature parameter φ and ǫ > 0, there exists an initial state of the algorithm for which the algorithm requires n Ω(log 1 p n) time to find a clique of size (1 + ǫ) log 1 p n. This implies that, for the worst possible initial configuration, the algorithm can only find cliques of size less than or equal to log 1 p n. In this worst-case setting, we thus see that for general n and p, f n,p,k is vulnerable to the Metropolis process only when k = (1 + ǫ) log 1 p n for ǫ very close to 0. As noted in the next paragraph, however, the results of the original paper give no indication of time taken in the average case.
There are two caveats which will be important later in our analysis: namely, the authors prove that (1) there exists an initial state for which it is hard to find large cliques and (2) there is no result on how this method performs in the average case or with partial information.
We shelf the issue of lack of average-case results for this method and for now consider the security of f n,p,k against Metropolis as-is and in the worst case as regards efficiency. In order to satisfy a security level of λ, we need the figure of n Ω(log 1 p n) to translate to a load of at least 2 λ when searching for cliques in the output of f n,p,k . We see by the following: . In order for f n,p,k to satisfy security parameter λ, this must be taken into account.
f n,p,k embeds a clique in a graph drawn from G n,1 2 of size (1 + ǫ) log 2 n. Thus, we need the spectral method using subset enumeration for c = (1+ǫ) log 2 n √ n to take at least 2 λ steps. Note from section 4.1.3 that subset enumeration for this choice of c must enumerate size-s = 2 log 2 10 c + 2 subsets. Deriving this explicitly, we can give a lower bound on s: s = 2 log 2 10 c + 2 = 2 log (10 (1 + ǫ)) √ n − 2 log log n + 2 = log n − 2 log log n + 2 + log 2 10 (1 + ǫ)
Using now the identity
k and the fact that ǫ is between 0 and 1, we know that the number of subsets enumerated is bounded from below by
s(log n−log s) = 2 Ω(log n)(log n−log Ω(log n)) = 2 Ω(log 2 n)
We now need to enforce that the above quantity is greater than or equal to 2 λ . Given that s = log n−2 log log n+2+log 2 5, the bounds used imply that we should take n = 2
. (This could perhaps be improved given a tighter analytic bound or expression for the binomial coefficient, but this will not make a difference in our final suggestions. The choice of n required to prevent the brute-force quasi-polynomial
